In philosophy departments, logical positivism has been ignored, as far as I am aware, for the last few decades. But in the outside world, it has become the de-facto worldview of many materialists. When you boil down the beliefs of the new atheists, you get to the statement that only science can generate reliable knowledge. Since theology is not scientific, it is not worth bothering with.
It’s this return of logic positivism that makes A. J. Ayer’s manifesto Language, Truth and Logic, written in 1936, relevant today. It is the next book I’ve been able to cross off my list of things I should have read ages ago. Ayer’s book is of great value because it is an open-eyed analysis of what logic positivism actually means. It is not just God who gets sucked up by the positivistic vacuum. So to does ethics, other minds, aesthetics and even atheism.
As Ayer says “…in so far as statements of value are significant, they are ordinary ‘scientific’ statements; and that in as in as far as they are not scientific, they are not in the literal sense significant, but simply expressions of emotion which can neither be true or false.” I have yet to see how ethical beliefs can be maintained as true by the new atheist, which is ironic because they spend much of their time labelling things they don’t like as very bad. On what grounds? There might be a non-theistic basis for ethics, but you certainly won’t find it in scientific materialism.
As for atheism, Ayer reminds us, “If the assertion that there is a God is nonsensical, then the atheist’s assertion that there is not a god is equally nonsensical, since it is only a significant proposition that can be significantly contradicted.” This might explain why the argument in chapter four of the God Delusion was laughed at by philosophers of all stripes.
It gets worse for the naïve logical positivists. Ayer admits that we have no reason to believe in other minds except that other people seem to act quite like us. In other word, we are back to the behaviourism that made B. F. Skinner so famous and now so reviled. And, as Alvin Plantinga has often noted, this puts other minds in the same boat as God.
So, Language, Truth and Logic teaches us that new atheist philosophy is incoherent. And that is from the man who wrote the book.
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Monday, May 18, 2009
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12 comments:
"As for atheism, Ayer reminds us, “If the assertion that there is a God is nonsensical, then the atheist’s assertion that there is not a god is equally nonsensical, since it is only a significant proposition that can be significantly contradicted.” This might explain why the argument in chapter four of the God Delusion was laughed at by philosophers of all stripes."
Hmmm. Firstly, Ayers has a curiously narrow idea of "atheism" if he thinks it's limited to those who claim "there IS no God", since most of us make no such absurd claim. Like most atheists, I am simply without a belief in God or gods - an altogether different prospect and still very much an atheistic postion.
As for Chapter Four of TGD, since it's entitled "Why There is Almost Certainly No God", I can't see how Ayer's comment is relevant to it. If Dawkins had entitled it "Why There Definitely Is No God", there would be a problem, but Dawkins isn't that silly.
It's strange that so many theists have to belt up strawman versions of Dawkins for some reason ...
Tim, thanks for your reply. With regard to chapter four of TGD, I don’t agree with you. Ayer would claim that the statement “There is a God” is as much nonsense as “Snarks go plop.” Thus, an entire chapters on “Why snarks almost certainly do not go plop” would be nonsense on stilts. So to for chapter four of TGD.
Your first point is harder to deal with and hinges on the difference between soft and hard atheism. Clearly, someone who, like you (a ‘soft atheist’), is simply without a belief in God cannot be convicted of nonsense by Ayer. However, someone (a ‘hard atheist’) who makes the claim “God does not exist” whether or not this is couched in probabilistic terms, can be. And this will be the case regardless of whether someone who is a hard atheist in practice retreats to soft atheism for rhetorical purposes when challenged. This, I’m afraid, happens rather a lot, although obviously not in your case.
Last time I checked (under Eliminative materialism) beliefs are an example of 'folk psychology' and do not exist. Hence we are all without beliefs. Even if they do exist, then we have no free will and can't 'choose' them anyway.
"With regard to chapter four of TGD, I don’t agree with you. Ayer would claim that the statement “There is a God” is as much nonsense as “Snarks go plop.” Thus, an entire chapters on “Why snarks almost certainly do not go plop” would be nonsense on stilts. So to for chapter four of TGD."
Chapter Four of TGD is merely looking at some varients of one of the most popular arguments/reasons for belief in God and arguing why Dawkins finds it unconvincing. He concludes by saying "I find that argument and all the other unconvincing, so I am without a belief in God". He puts it, "so there is almost certainly no God", but since he's already identified himself as a so-called "soft atheist", as I am, it's clear what he means.
There is nothing philosophically absurd about Ch. 4 of TGD.
"Clearly, someone who, like you (a ‘soft atheist’), is simply without a belief in God cannot be convicted of nonsense by Ayer."
Then neither can Dawkins.
"However, someone (a ‘hard atheist’) who makes the claim “God does not exist” whether or not this is couched in probabilistic terms, can be."
Dawkins simply finds the argument/reasons given for God unconvicing. So do I. If you say to a child "I find your arguments for Santa unconvincing so, while I certainly can't absolutely rule out the possibility he exists, I think there is almost certainly no Santa" are you really making some kind of "probabilistic" assessment? Are you really a "hard Asantaist" or are you simply epxressing how unconvinced you are?
It seems to me you are simply doing the latter. So am I when I comes to God. So is Dawkins.
Sorry, but you'll have to find some other way to dismiss him. I do find it weird the way so many people dismiss "Dawkins' arguments" as though he came up with them himself. I keep seeing snooty dismissals of his book on the grounds that he's "theologically illiterate" or "philosophically unsophisticated" and "his arguments" can, therefore, be disregarded. Strangely, I seem to recall precisely the same arguments being presented to me when I did a degree in philosophy. And the theology graduate I studied with didn't have any amazing counters to them in his kit bag.
Methinks some people are trying to sweep Dawkins' success in popularising these venerable and formidable arguments under the carpet by pretending he doesn't know what he's talking about.
Hi Tim,
Thanks for your reply. If I recall, Dawkins deals with the traditional arguments in chapter 3 and presents his own positive argument for why God does not exist in chapter 4. I'm referring to the latter and I think you are reading from the former.
My remarks, which I stand by, relate to chapter four which is not a chapter written by a soft atheist, in my opinion.
Best wishes
James
As I recall, there weren't many arguments presented in the God Delusion. Nor did it strike me as particularly strident; gently mocking perhaps. It reminded me more of a cozy afternoon chat with my dad.
Dawkins seems to go out of his way to misunderstand, distort or parody the traditional arguments for God.
Even if they may not be good enough for any rigorous demonstration of God's existence, Dawkins does less than nada to show it.
James:
"If I recall, Dawkins deals with the traditional arguments in chapter 3 and presents his own positive argument for why God does not exist in chapter 4. I'm referring to the latter and I think you are reading from the former."
No, I'm quite definitely reading Ch. 4 - I have it here in front of me. Dawkins deals with a range of other arguments in Ch. 3 and discusses why he finds them unconvincing. He then focuses on variants of the Argument from Design in Ch. 4 because (i) it's one he feels intersects with his field of expertise and (ii) it's the one most commonly invoked by modern theists. I've yet to come across someone seriously trying to use the Ontological Argument on me recently.
"My remarks, which I stand by, relate to chapter four which is not a chapter written by a soft atheist, in my opinion."
How so? He examines the various manifestations of the Teleological Argument and states why he finds them unconvincing. He remains unconvnced and so he is without a belief in God. So he's a so-called "soft atheist". Like me.
Bjørn:
"Dawkins seems to go out of his way to misunderstand, distort or parody the traditional arguments for God."
So people keep claiming to me. I can't see it. I can't see any difference between the way Dawkins presents these arguments and the way my Philosophy lecturers did when I was doing a Philosophy degree. This attempted dismissal of Dawkins' book smells of an attempted rhetorical dodge. And a snooty one at that.
Tim,
IIRC, in chapter four Dawkins presents an argument that God almost certainly does not exist because he must be more complex than what he is supposed to explain. That's a hard atheist argument and Dawkins is too honest to deny he is a hard atheist.
Note that this renders his argument nonsense to Ayer, but not to me. I just think it is wrong.
Ayer admits that we have no reason to believe in other minds except that other people seem to act quite like us. What's wrong with that? That's a pretty good reason to hold that belief, although proof is impossible. What possible other reason could there be to believe in other minds?
On other minds, I'd suggest empathy goes a lot further than noting other objects behave like we do. Essentially, Ayer's is an argument from analogy:
I have a mind;
Other people behave like me;
Therefore they have minds.
The problems go both ways:
I have a mind;
Bob behaves nothing like me;
Therefore Bob has no mind.
and
I have a mind;
That robot behaves like me;
Therefore that robot has a mind.
The first leads to bigotry and the second to animal rights, neither of which are good ideas at all.
Ayer admits that we have no reason to believe in other minds except that other people seem to act quite like us.What's wrong with that? That's a pretty good reason to hold that belief, although proof is impossible.I think part of the problem is that there is a deep incongruity here. Lots of things seem to be like other things, but these seemings are very easily illusory. It leaves an awful lot of space to acknowledge that they might not really be like the other things.
That's obviously insufficient for our belief in other minds. To say that's our only justification for believing in other minds is to leave way too much room for solipsism, the denial of other minds. And solipsism isn't just false; it's insane.
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